How Long Does a Time Last?

Abstract

The paper begins by examining an intuitive complaint against the possibility of instantaneous existence. This complaint has force under the condition that dynamic time has metaphysical priority over existence, whereby existence is limited in reality by the vicissitudes of time. Standard conceptions of present reality construe it as instantaneous. Accordingly, the complaint against instantaneous existence extends to present reality under its forceful conditions. A large proportion of the paper is then devoted to exploring how present reality might support lasting existents, through temporally extended presents and bifurcated time, finally arriving at an account of duration as a monadic property of existents that can survive external changes. Yet, whether the resultant position is tenable relies heavily on whether instantaneous existents can plausibly be refused admittance to reality. Whilst the sketch of a proposal is suggested, the demand for adequately subverting the need of such existents is advanced as a future challenge.