Do not harm: a minimal defense of conscientious objection in the medical profession.

Abstract

I defend conscientious objection (CO) in the medical profession by refuting the incompatibility thesis (IT). IT maintains that CO is incompatible with fulfilling the objectives and obligations of the medical profession and thus impermissible for medical professionals. To refute IT, I construct a case of conscience-based refusal in parallel with a case of profession-based refusal, such that both cases fulfill the primary objective and core obligation of the medical profession, thereby directly demonstrating the compatibility of CO with fulfilling obligations in the medical profession. I conclude that IT is false and thus that CO is permissible for medical professionals. I then defend my argument against potential objections. My argument strategy is two-fold. First, to avoid begging the question, I follow a neutral definition of CO that is compatible with IT. Second, to make the argument as logically strong as possible, I assume only minimal claims about the primary objective and core obligation of the medical profession that should be acceptable to (at least some) defenders of IT.