Cognitive and Behavioral Radicalization: An Explanatory Split?

Abstract

This article argues that the general principle that there is an explanatory split between cognitive radicalization and behavioral radicalization does not hold. It first sketches the principle and the evidence adduced in favour of it. The first major problem with the principle is that it is based merely on evidence about beliefs regarding the legitimacy of using violence and evidence about the actual use of violence. The second major problem is that the evidence adduced in support of the explanatory split principle is confined to the cognitive and behavioural radicalization of individuals. However, it is widely acknowledged that groups and social entities, like institutions, ministries, and governments, can equally well radicalize—cognitively or behaviorally, or both. The article hypothesizes that the correlation may well be stronger in the case of groups and social entities, in fact even when narrowly understood as a correlation between beliefs about violence and the actual use of violence. Drawing on social epistemology, group psychology, and ethics, several reasons are given for why this may be. Subsequently, various objections are discussed and what they mean for the alternative understanding of the relation between cognitive and behavioral radicalization defended here. Finally, it is explored what giving up on a general explanatory split principle and construing a more nuanced and fine-grained version of it would mean for how we study cognitive and behavioural radicalization.