{"title":"Monotonicity and Robust Implementation Under Forward-Induction Reasoning","authors":"Pierpaolo Battigalli, Emiliano Catonini","doi":"10.3982/ECTA23709","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>In sequential games, the set of paths consistent with rationality and forward-induction reasoning may change nonmonotonically when adding transparent restrictions on players' beliefs. Yet, we prove that—in an incomplete-information environment—predictions become sharper when the restrictions only concern initial beliefs about types. Thus, strong rationalizability for games with payoff uncertainty characterizes the path predictions of forward-induction reasoning across all possible restrictions on players' hierarchies of exogenous beliefs. With this, we can solve an open problem: the implementation of social choice functions through sequential mechanisms under forward-induction reasoning—which considerably expands the realm of implementable functions compared with simultaneous mechanisms (Müller (2016))—is indeed robust in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2009).</p>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":"94 2","pages":"505-536"},"PeriodicalIF":6.2000,"publicationDate":"2026-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA23709","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Econometrica","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/ECTA23709","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In sequential games, the set of paths consistent with rationality and forward-induction reasoning may change nonmonotonically when adding transparent restrictions on players' beliefs. Yet, we prove that—in an incomplete-information environment—predictions become sharper when the restrictions only concern initial beliefs about types. Thus, strong rationalizability for games with payoff uncertainty characterizes the path predictions of forward-induction reasoning across all possible restrictions on players' hierarchies of exogenous beliefs. With this, we can solve an open problem: the implementation of social choice functions through sequential mechanisms under forward-induction reasoning—which considerably expands the realm of implementable functions compared with simultaneous mechanisms (Müller (2016))—is indeed robust in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2009).
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