Who Benefits From Government Tax-Subsidies for Corporate Charitable Food Donations?

IF 5.1 3区 管理学 Q1 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING
Production and Operations Management Pub Date : 2025-06-02 eCollection Date: 2026-02-01 DOI:10.1177/10591478251350098
Armağan Özbilge, Saif Benjaafar, Elkafi Hassini, Mahmut Parlar
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Abstract

Leveraging government tax incentives to prompt corporate charitable giving has gained considerable popularity over the past decade. This paper sheds light on the broader consequences of the U.S. government's tax-subsidy policy for charitable food donations, which is determined based on the fair market value (FMV) of the donated products. We incorporate the tax-subsidy into a monopolist food retailer's after-tax profit function. Market demand is both price- and quality-dependent, and the shelf-life of the goods is determined by their initial quality and deterioration rate. The retailer makes joint quantity and pricing decisions over two periods, procuring goods at the start of the selling season and (possibly) donating at the end of period 1. We characterize the retailer's optimal policy and specify conditions under which she donates some, all, or none of her leftover inventory. We explore the impact of government tax-subsidies on the retailer's actions, consumer surplus, quantity of donations, and total welfare. We show that tax-subsidies may motivate retailers to intentionally create supply scarcity (by donating more) to increase FMV (determined by the second-period price), thereby enhancing tax deductions. While tax-subsidies encourage donations, they can also unintentionally harm consumers by reducing supply and raising prices. Interestingly, we show that a higher subsidy does not necessarily lead to more donations; the retailer may choose to donate fewer units to achieve the same tax deduction while increasing sales revenue. We investigate conditions under which tax-subsidies can simultaneously increase donations, consumer surplus, and retail profit. We show that this outcome is possible only when retailers donate low-quality goods in modest quantities. Our findings reveal how FMV-dependent tax-subsidies can backfire, reducing both consumer surplus and total welfare while benefiting the retailer. Governments must carefully weigh the benefits of donations against potential harm caused to consumers.

企业慈善食品捐赠的政府税收补贴谁受益?
在过去十年中,利用政府税收优惠来促进企业慈善捐赠的做法相当受欢迎。本文揭示了美国政府对慈善食品捐赠的税收补贴政策的更广泛后果,该政策是根据捐赠产品的公平市场价值(FMV)确定的。我们将税收补贴纳入垄断食品零售商的税后利润函数。市场需求既取决于价格也取决于质量,而商品的保质期则取决于它们的初始质量和劣化率。零售商在两个时期内共同做出数量和定价决策,在销售季节开始时采购商品,(可能)在销售季节1结束时捐赠。我们描述了零售商的最优策略,并指定了她捐赠部分、全部或不捐赠剩余库存的条件。我们探讨了政府税收补贴对零售商行为、消费者剩余、捐赠数量和总福利的影响。我们表明,税收补贴可能会激励零售商有意制造供应短缺(通过捐赠更多)以增加FMV(由第二阶段价格决定),从而增强税收减免。虽然税收补贴鼓励捐赠,但它们也可能通过减少供应和提高价格而无意中伤害消费者。有趣的是,我们表明,更高的补贴并不一定导致更多的捐赠;零售商可能会选择捐赠较少的单位来实现相同的税收减免,同时增加销售收入。我们研究了税收补贴可以同时增加捐赠、消费者剩余和零售利润的条件。我们表明,只有当零售商捐赠少量低质量商品时,才有可能出现这种结果。我们的研究结果揭示了依赖于fmv的税收补贴如何适得其反,减少消费者剩余和总福利,同时使零售商受益。政府必须仔细权衡捐赠的好处和对消费者造成的潜在伤害。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Production and Operations Management
Production and Operations Management 管理科学-工程:制造
CiteScore
7.50
自引率
16.00%
发文量
278
审稿时长
24 months
期刊介绍: The mission of Production and Operations Management is to serve as the flagship research journal in operations management in manufacturing and services. The journal publishes scientific research into the problems, interest, and concerns of managers who manage product and process design, operations, and supply chains. It covers all topics in product and process design, operations, and supply chain management and welcomes papers using any research paradigm.
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