Fun Man Fung*, , , Jamie Z. Y. Khoo, , , Imee S. Martinez, , and , Hooi Ling Lee,
{"title":"Chemical Security in a Fragmenting World: ASEAN as a Model for Science Diplomacy?","authors":"Fun Man Fung*, , , Jamie Z. Y. Khoo, , , Imee S. Martinez, , and , Hooi Ling Lee, ","doi":"10.1021/acs.chas.6c00011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p >The 2023 verification of the destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) marks a historic, yet potentially misunderstood, success. This commentary argues that this milestone masks a paradigm shift in the primary threat: from the destruction of legacy stockpiles to the prevention of re-emergence, a challenge now defined as chemical security. In an era of geopolitical fragmentation and economic friction that disproportionately strains the scientific capacity of the Global South, traditional multilateral frameworks are eroding. This piece posits that the “ASEAN” way─a model of regional, consensus-driven diplomacy exemplified by the successful 2025 ASEAN Summit that offers a potent alternative framework. By leveraging ASEAN’s proven mechanisms for deep technical cooperation in nontraditional security threats, such as Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), this model can be adapted to address the shared vulnerabilities of chemical security. It concludes with an urgent call for Science Diplomacy, mandating that the scientific and chemical communities actively engage policymakers, integrate resilience frameworks, and utilize existing regional collaborations to ensure that chemical security is embedded within this new, effective brand of regional multilateralism.</p>","PeriodicalId":73648,"journal":{"name":"Journal of chemical health & safety","volume":"33 2","pages":"180–184"},"PeriodicalIF":3.4000,"publicationDate":"2026-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/acs.chas.6c00011","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of chemical health & safety","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.chas.6c00011","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/2/16 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The 2023 verification of the destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) marks a historic, yet potentially misunderstood, success. This commentary argues that this milestone masks a paradigm shift in the primary threat: from the destruction of legacy stockpiles to the prevention of re-emergence, a challenge now defined as chemical security. In an era of geopolitical fragmentation and economic friction that disproportionately strains the scientific capacity of the Global South, traditional multilateral frameworks are eroding. This piece posits that the “ASEAN” way─a model of regional, consensus-driven diplomacy exemplified by the successful 2025 ASEAN Summit that offers a potent alternative framework. By leveraging ASEAN’s proven mechanisms for deep technical cooperation in nontraditional security threats, such as Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), this model can be adapted to address the shared vulnerabilities of chemical security. It concludes with an urgent call for Science Diplomacy, mandating that the scientific and chemical communities actively engage policymakers, integrate resilience frameworks, and utilize existing regional collaborations to ensure that chemical security is embedded within this new, effective brand of regional multilateralism.