Chemical Security in a Fragmenting World: ASEAN as a Model for Science Diplomacy?

IF 3.4
Journal of chemical health & safety Pub Date : 2026-03-23 Epub Date: 2026-02-16 DOI:10.1021/acs.chas.6c00011
Fun Man Fung*, , , Jamie Z. Y. Khoo, , , Imee S. Martinez, , and , Hooi Ling Lee, 
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The 2023 verification of the destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) marks a historic, yet potentially misunderstood, success. This commentary argues that this milestone masks a paradigm shift in the primary threat: from the destruction of legacy stockpiles to the prevention of re-emergence, a challenge now defined as chemical security. In an era of geopolitical fragmentation and economic friction that disproportionately strains the scientific capacity of the Global South, traditional multilateral frameworks are eroding. This piece posits that the “ASEAN” way─a model of regional, consensus-driven diplomacy exemplified by the successful 2025 ASEAN Summit that offers a potent alternative framework. By leveraging ASEAN’s proven mechanisms for deep technical cooperation in nontraditional security threats, such as Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), this model can be adapted to address the shared vulnerabilities of chemical security. It concludes with an urgent call for Science Diplomacy, mandating that the scientific and chemical communities actively engage policymakers, integrate resilience frameworks, and utilize existing regional collaborations to ensure that chemical security is embedded within this new, effective brand of regional multilateralism.

支离破碎的世界中的化学安全:东盟作为科学外交的典范?
禁止化学武器组织(禁化武组织)将于2023年对所有已申报的化学武器库存进行销毁核查,这标志着历史性的成功,但也可能被误解。本评论认为,这一里程碑掩盖了主要威胁的范式转变:从销毁遗留库存到防止重新出现,这一挑战现在被定义为化学品安全。在地缘政治分裂和经济摩擦的时代,这极大地挤压了全球南方国家的科学能力,传统的多边框架正在受到侵蚀。本文认为,“东盟”方式──以2025年东盟峰会的成功为例的区域共识驱动型外交模式──提供了一个强有力的替代框架。通过利用东盟在减少灾害风险(DRR)等非传统安全威胁方面行之有效的深度技术合作机制,这一模式可以适用于解决化学品安全的共同弱点。报告最后紧急呼吁开展科学外交,要求科学界和化学界积极与政策制定者接触,整合复原力框架,并利用现有的区域合作,确保将化学品安全纳入这一新的、有效的区域多边主义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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CiteScore
4.20
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