Valence Asymmetry in Cognition—A Formal Account

Abstract

Academic Abstract Valence asymmetries —the tendency for bad stimuli to elicit more processing effort than good ones—have been widely observed but remain theoretically contested. To advance this debate, we present a formalized account integrating two major explanatory perspectives: the intrapsychic (or phylogenetic ) approach, which locates the effect in internal evaluative mechanisms, and the ecological (or ontogenetic ) approach, which attributes it primarily to environmental factors. We introduce a concise set of parameters to specify key concepts and analyze the argumentative structure of each perspective. This yields three major insights: (a) the traditional labels for these approaches are misleading, and we suggest using valence-driven and distinctiveness-driven instead, (b) theories must specify how exactly good and bad stimuli are defined, and (c) some explanations rely on implicit yet critical assumptions, such as the probability of having contact with stimuli. Clarifying these foundations provides a framework for informative empirical tests in future research. Public Abstract Why do people pay more attention to bad things than to good ones? Psychologists call this pattern a valence asymmetry . Although the effect is well established, its causes are still debated. To advance this debate, we translate two leading ideas about this bias into a precise mathematical model. This allows us to see how the explanations differ, what each predicts, and where they overlap. This analysis reveals three important insights: First, some widely used terms are misleading, and we suggest using clearer alternatives like valence-driven and distinctiveness-driven instead. Second, researchers need to define more carefully what actually counts as good or bad . Third, many theories rely on hidden assumptions—such as how often people encounter certain kinds of stimuli. Making those assumptions explicit should help future studies test competing explanations more directly.