Forward-Looking Concept Functions and the Function/Accident Distinction.

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
ERKENNTNIS Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-05-20 DOI:10.1007/s10670-025-00957-1
Aneta Zuber
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Abstract

Appealing to the functions of concepts in conceptual engineering projects has been hailed as a promising avenue to explain defects of concepts, the possibility of amelioration, and the continuity of topic post engineering. Some of the most prominent theories of concept functions build on what I call the Usefulness Thesis, i.e. what makes something the function of a concept is what makes it useful. In this paper, I argue that this approach does not meet some of the most fundamental adequacy criteria for a theory of function, that is, (1) they do not draw a stable function/accident distinction and (2) they cannot account for the normativity of functions. I show that theories of concept function that build on the Usefulness Thesis are all essentially forward-looking theories of functions and show that these theories face a problem of overreach and a vacuous normativity proviso. I further argue that they do not lend themselves to conceptual critique, so they are not fit for conceptual engineering purposes.

前瞻性概念功能与功能/事故区分。
在概念工程项目中,利用概念的功能来解释概念的缺陷、改进的可能性以及工程后主题的连续性是一种很有前途的途径。一些最著名的概念函数理论建立在我称之为有用性命题的基础上,也就是说,什么东西是概念的功能,什么东西是有用的。在本文中,我认为这种方法不满足函数理论的一些最基本的充分性标准,即(1)它们没有绘制稳定函数/事故的区别,(2)它们不能解释函数的规范性。我表明,建立在有用性论题基础上的概念函数理论本质上都是前瞻性的函数理论,并表明这些理论面临着过度延伸和空洞的规范性附带条件的问题。我进一步认为,它们不适合用于概念批判,因此它们不适合用于概念工程目的。
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来源期刊
ERKENNTNIS
ERKENNTNIS PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
11.10%
发文量
116
期刊介绍: Erkenntnis is a philosophical journal publishing papers committed in one way or another to the philosophical attitude which is signified by the label ''scientific philosophy''. It concentrates on those philosophical fields which are particularly inspired by this attitude, although other topics are welcome as well. These fields are:- Epistemology - Philosophy of science, foundations and methodology of science in general and of natural and human sciences such as physics, biology, psychology, economics, social sciences in particular - Philosophy of mathematics - Logic, philosophy of logic, and all kinds of philosophical logics - Philosophy of language - Ontology, metaphysics, theory of modality - Philosophical psychology, philosophy of mind, neurophilosophy - Practical philosophy, i.e. ethics, philosophy of action, philosophy of law, etc. One of the objectives of Erkenntnis is the provision of a suitable platform for the discussion of controversial issues; another is the provision of timely, competent reviews of important publications in an ever-growing field of research.In recent years, philosophers standing quite outside the pale of analytic philosophy have also paid careful, and indeed most welcome, attention to precision of concept and language, to arguments, and to well-grounded foundations. Erkenntnis provides for them, and for philosophers of all persuasions, a place of meeting, of discussion, and of disputation.Erkenntnis was originally founded in 1930 by Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, it was revived in 1975 by Carl G. Hempel, Wolfang Stegmüller, and Wilhelm K. Essler. You can find more information about this in the article “Hempel: The old and the new ‘Erkenntnis’” accessible in the tabs to the right.Today, Erkenntnis is one of the leading journals in philosophy worldwide and attracts first-class authors at all stages of career; from young philosophers at the PhD level up to established academic philosophers and highly renowned senior scholars. We pride ourselves on supplying our authors with substantial referee reports, subject to a turnaround time of about three months until the first decision. The acceptance rate for publications in the journal is presently slightly below 10%.
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