Enabling enterprise coordination without fiscal burden: New policy pathways for coal waste management

IF 9.3 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Energy Policy Pub Date : 2026-06-01 Epub Date: 2026-02-24 DOI:10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115195
Jiaojiao Ge , Lun Ran , Jiancai Wang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Coal-fired power plants generate substantial waste that requires green pretreatment before valorization, yet high costs and demand uncertainty discourage investment. Although government subsidies are often advocated to promote waste management, this study focuses on an implementable, enterprise-led alternative: recycler-provided pretreatment cost sharing as a contract-based mechanism within the supply chain, alongside recycler-to-plant demand information sharing. Using a game-theoretic model with demand uncertainty and quality differentiation, we compare equilibrium outcomes under four coordination regimes: no cooperation, information sharing only, subsidization only, and a combined mechanism. Results show that information transparency robustly improves coordination by enabling state-contingent pretreatment decisions and sustaining mutual profitability across diverse market conditions. Subsidization increases pretreatment by relieving the plant’s effective cost burden, but its attractiveness to the recycler is limited by direct payment costs, implying that cost-sharing requires targeted, performance-linked design. Combining the two instruments can strengthen outcomes under uncertainty but often provides limited incremental benefits beyond transparency. Policy implications emphasize prioritizing transparency infrastructure, standardized disclosure, and data governance as a baseline, while facilitating subsidy-like cost sharing selectively in contexts where quality premia and uncertainty make cost relief more likely to generate shared gains.
使企业协调没有财政负担:煤炭废物管理的新政策途径
燃煤电厂产生大量废弃物,需要绿色预处理才能实现价值增值,但高成本和需求不确定性阻碍了投资。虽然政府补贴经常被提倡促进废物管理,但本研究侧重于一个可实施的、企业主导的替代方案:作为供应链中基于合同的机制,回收商提供的预处理成本分担,以及回收商到工厂的需求信息共享。本文利用具有需求不确定性和质量差异的博弈论模型,比较了不合作、信息共享、补贴和联合机制下的均衡结果。研究结果表明,信息透明通过在不同市场条件下实现状态条件下的预处理决策和维持相互盈利能力,有力地改善了协调。补贴通过减轻工厂的有效成本负担来增加预处理,但其对回收商的吸引力受到直接支付成本的限制,这意味着成本分担需要有针对性的、与性能挂钩的设计。将这两种工具结合起来可以加强不确定情况下的成果,但除了透明度之外,往往只能提供有限的增量效益。政策影响强调优先考虑透明度基础设施、标准化披露和数据治理作为基线,同时在质量溢价和不确定性使成本减免更有可能产生共享收益的情况下,有选择地促进类似补贴的成本分担。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Energy Policy
Energy Policy 管理科学-环境科学
CiteScore
17.30
自引率
5.60%
发文量
540
审稿时长
7.9 months
期刊介绍: Energy policy is the manner in which a given entity (often governmental) has decided to address issues of energy development including energy conversion, distribution and use as well as reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in order to contribute to climate change mitigation. The attributes of energy policy may include legislation, international treaties, incentives to investment, guidelines for energy conservation, taxation and other public policy techniques. Energy policy is closely related to climate change policy because totalled worldwide the energy sector emits more greenhouse gas than other sectors.
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