{"title":"Success functions in large contests","authors":"Yaron Azrieli , Christopher P. Chambers","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2026.02.004","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random element, and when winners are those whose performance exceeds a cutoff determined by the designer’s budget constraint. Any such <em>Random Performance Function (RPF)</em> satisfies a Co-monotonicity property, which implies that opponents’ effort distributions can be unambiguously ranked based on how competitive they are. We prove that Co-monotonicity, along with standard continuity and monotonicity properties, in fact characterize the class of RPFs. We also describe necessary and sufficient conditions for the noise term to have an additive structure. “The idea of a continuum of traders may seem outlandish to the reader. Actually, it is no stranger than a continuum of prices or of strategies or a continuum of <ddq>‘particles’</ddq> in fluid mechanics... It should be emphasized that our consideration of a continuum of traders is not merely a mathematical exercise; it is the expression of an economic idea.” In: <em>Markets with a continuum of traders</em>, Robert J. Aumann, Econometrica 1964</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48291,"journal":{"name":"Games and Economic Behavior","volume":"157 ","pages":"Pages 253-262"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2026-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Games and Economic Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825626000242","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/2/14 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We consider contests with a large set (continuum) of participants and axiomatize contest success functions that arise when performance is composed of both effort and a random element, and when winners are those whose performance exceeds a cutoff determined by the designer’s budget constraint. Any such Random Performance Function (RPF) satisfies a Co-monotonicity property, which implies that opponents’ effort distributions can be unambiguously ranked based on how competitive they are. We prove that Co-monotonicity, along with standard continuity and monotonicity properties, in fact characterize the class of RPFs. We also describe necessary and sufficient conditions for the noise term to have an additive structure. “The idea of a continuum of traders may seem outlandish to the reader. Actually, it is no stranger than a continuum of prices or of strategies or a continuum of <ddq>‘particles’</ddq> in fluid mechanics... It should be emphasized that our consideration of a continuum of traders is not merely a mathematical exercise; it is the expression of an economic idea.” In: Markets with a continuum of traders, Robert J. Aumann, Econometrica 1964
期刊介绍:
Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology