{"title":"Health, incentives, and retirement choice: A life-cycle analysis from China","authors":"Chao Li , Han Cang","doi":"10.1016/j.chieco.2026.102667","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>China's rapid population aging and ongoing pension reforms have fundamentally reshaped retirement behavior, yet the interaction between health dynamics and retirement incentives remains insufficiently understood. This paper develops a lifecycle model with endogenous retirement and health accumulation under the Basic Old-Age Insurance (BOAI) system calibrated to Chinese data. The model replicates observed retirement patterns and reveals that better health postpones retirement, while higher pension replacement ratios, amplified by a contribution-floor adjustment, encourage earlier labor exit, particularly for low-income workers. Health effects operate primarily through two channels: the income channel, where income decline increases the likelihood of triggering the adjustment mechanism and incentivizes early retirement; and the risk channel, where deteriorating health increases morbidity and mortality uncertainty and accelerates retirement. Counterfactual simulations reveal asymmetry in health effects: Lower personal account rate and individual productivity disproportionately affect unhealthy households, while increasing contribution rate primarily accelerates retirement among healthier workers.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48285,"journal":{"name":"中国经济评论","volume":"96 ","pages":"Article 102667"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9000,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"中国经济评论","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1043951X26000179","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/1/20 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
China's rapid population aging and ongoing pension reforms have fundamentally reshaped retirement behavior, yet the interaction between health dynamics and retirement incentives remains insufficiently understood. This paper develops a lifecycle model with endogenous retirement and health accumulation under the Basic Old-Age Insurance (BOAI) system calibrated to Chinese data. The model replicates observed retirement patterns and reveals that better health postpones retirement, while higher pension replacement ratios, amplified by a contribution-floor adjustment, encourage earlier labor exit, particularly for low-income workers. Health effects operate primarily through two channels: the income channel, where income decline increases the likelihood of triggering the adjustment mechanism and incentivizes early retirement; and the risk channel, where deteriorating health increases morbidity and mortality uncertainty and accelerates retirement. Counterfactual simulations reveal asymmetry in health effects: Lower personal account rate and individual productivity disproportionately affect unhealthy households, while increasing contribution rate primarily accelerates retirement among healthier workers.
期刊介绍:
The China Economic Review publishes original works of scholarship which add to the knowledge of the economy of China and to economies as a discipline. We seek, in particular, papers dealing with policy, performance and institutional change. Empirical papers normally use a formal model, a data set, and standard statistical techniques. Submissions are subjected to double-blind peer review.