Hierarchy in green: Subordinate executives and eco-innovation dynamics

IF 13.5 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Energy Economics Pub Date : 2026-02-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-16 DOI:10.1016/j.eneco.2026.109146
Millie Liew , Zhuo Li , June Cao
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Internal governance is the process through which subordinate executives, driven by their longer decision horizons and focus on long-term value, counteract the CEO's short-term self-interests to influence corporate decisions. We examine whether and how internal governance affects eco-innovation, which delivers long-term value at the expense of initial investment outlays. We find that more effective internal governance motivates eco-innovation and that this effect operates through two channels. First, subordinate executives' bottom-up influence on the CEO prompts them to increase their long-term awareness to exercise this influence and motivate eco-innovation. Second, more effective internal governance enhances the top management team's ecological awareness to motivate eco-innovation. We further reveal that subordinate-driven internal governance plays a more significant role when CEOs are more opportunistic. Last, we find that more effective internal governance improves eco-innovation quality, highlighting that subordinates play an important role in both the quantity and quality of firms' eco-innovation.
绿色环境中的层级:下属高管与生态创新动态
内部治理是下属高管在更长远的决策视野和对长期价值的关注的驱使下,抵消CEO的短期自身利益,从而影响公司决策的过程。我们研究内部治理是否以及如何影响生态创新,生态创新以初始投资支出为代价提供长期价值。我们发现,更有效的内部治理可以激励生态创新,这种效应通过两个渠道发挥作用。首先,下级高管对CEO自下而上的影响力促使他们增强行使这种影响力的长期意识,从而推动生态创新。第二,更有效的内部治理可以增强高层管理团队的生态意识,从而激发生态创新。我们进一步发现,ceo机会主义倾向越强,下属驱动型内部治理的作用越显著。最后,我们发现更有效的内部治理可以提高生态创新的质量,强调下属对企业生态创新的数量和质量都起着重要作用。
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来源期刊
Energy Economics
Energy Economics ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
18.60
自引率
12.50%
发文量
524
期刊介绍: Energy Economics is a field journal that focuses on energy economics and energy finance. It covers various themes including the exploitation, conversion, and use of energy, markets for energy commodities and derivatives, regulation and taxation, forecasting, environment and climate, international trade, development, and monetary policy. The journal welcomes contributions that utilize diverse methods such as experiments, surveys, econometrics, decomposition, simulation models, equilibrium models, optimization models, and analytical models. It publishes a combination of papers employing different methods to explore a wide range of topics. The journal's replication policy encourages the submission of replication studies, wherein researchers reproduce and extend the key results of original studies while explaining any differences. Energy Economics is indexed and abstracted in several databases including Environmental Abstracts, Fuel and Energy Abstracts, Social Sciences Citation Index, GEOBASE, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Journal of Economic Literature, INSPEC, and more.
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