Split incentives and energy efficiency investment: Evidence from the housing market

Abstract

Investments in energy efficiency in the built environment play a crucial role in global efforts to combat climate change. However, a significant obstacle to these investments arises from the differing incentives between landlords and tenants in the housing market. Landlords, who are typically not responsible for utility costs, may choose to invest less in energy efficiency improvements if these investments are not adequately reflected in rents. Our study provides empirical evidence of this market distortion, drawing on a comprehensive panel dataset from the Dutch housing market covering 3.8 million homes. We implement a quasi-experimental event study design that exploits transitions from rental to owner-occupied status while holding both the dwelling and the household constant. This identification strategy enables us to isolate changes in energy use attributable to tenure status. Our findings indicate a gradual decline in natural gas consumption following the transition to home-ownership, with an average reduction of about 2% that increases to as much as 5% nine years after the transition. In electricity consumption, split incentives are less important, given that tenants control the use and stock of their appliances, and we find no effect of changes in tenure status. Together, these findings provide empirical support for the relevance of tenure-based incentives in shaping energy-related decisions and can inform the design of targeted policies aimed at improving the energy performance of the rental housing stock.