Do aggressive CFOs borrow short-term?

IF 3.9 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Yong Kyu Gam , Andy Kim Young Han , Junho Park , Hojong Shin
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study whether CFOs’ psychological traits affect debt maturity choices. Using facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) as a proxy for achievement drive, we measure 2494 CFOs and 2408 CEOs from 1992 to 2020. Higher-CFO fWHR predicts significantly shorter debt maturity with larger number of lead managers in syndicated loans, while CEO fWHR has no effect. The relationship is strongest when rollover risk is high and is confirmed in loan-level analyses and survives difference-in-differences test around CFO turnovers. Short-term borrowing by high-fWHR CFOs is not value-destroying: markets react positively, distress risk declines, and these CFOs are more often promoted externally to CEO.
激进的首席财务官会短期借贷吗?
我们研究了财务总监的心理特征是否影响债务期限的选择。利用面部宽高比(fWHR)作为成就驱动的代理,我们测量了1992年至2020年的2494名cfo和2408名ceo。在银团贷款中,首席财务官fWHR越高,主经理人数越多,债务期限越短,而首席执行官fWHR则没有影响。当展期风险高时,这种关系最强,并在贷款水平分析中得到证实,并且在围绕首席财务官更替的差异检验中幸存下来。高whr首席财务官的短期借款不会破坏价值:市场反应积极,陷入困境的风险下降,这些首席财务官通常从外部晋升为首席执行官。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
13.20
自引率
6.10%
发文量
75
审稿时长
69 days
期刊介绍: Behavioral and Experimental Finance represent lenses and approaches through which we can view financial decision-making. The aim of the journal is to publish high quality research in all fields of finance, where such research is carried out with a behavioral perspective and / or is carried out via experimental methods. It is open to but not limited to papers which cover investigations of biases, the role of various neurological markers in financial decision making, national and organizational culture as it impacts financial decision making, sentiment and asset pricing, the design and implementation of experiments to investigate financial decision making and trading, methodological experiments, and natural experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance welcomes full-length and short letter papers in the area of behavioral finance and experimental finance. The focus is on rapid dissemination of high-impact research in these areas.
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