Public goods in a network: A Bayesian approach

IF 1.3 Q3 ECONOMICS

Research in Economics Pub Date : 2026-03-01 Epub Date: 2026-01-10 DOI:10.1016/j.rie.2026.101113

Benhur Ruqsana

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The primary objective of this paper is to explore strategic behaviour in public goods allocation models under incomplete information with an exogenously given network. In order to do so, a game-theoretical framework is developed by incorporating beliefs about an uncertain state of the world. The equilibrium behaviour of individuals in public goods allocation is then characterized, with a particular focus on how the network structure and belief distribution influence these outcomes. Additionally, the impact of free-riding behaviour on welfare is examined, highlighting the role of network topology in determining efficiency. Finally, to ensure robustness, the model is tested under varying conditions.

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网络中的公共产品：贝叶斯方法

本文的主要目的是探讨外生给定网络下不完全信息下公共物品配置模型中的战略行为。为了做到这一点，博弈论框架是通过结合关于世界不确定状态的信念而发展起来的。然后描述了个人在公共物品分配中的均衡行为，特别关注网络结构和信念分布如何影响这些结果。此外，研究了搭便车行为对福利的影响，强调了网络拓扑在决定效率中的作用。最后，为了保证模型的鲁棒性，对模型进行了不同条件下的检验。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Research in Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

89 days

期刊介绍： Established in 1947, Research in Economics is one of the oldest general-interest economics journals in the world and the main one among those based in Italy. The purpose of the journal is to select original theoretical and empirical articles that will have high impact on the debate in the social sciences; since 1947, it has published important research contributions on a wide range of topics. A summary of our editorial policy is this: the editors make a preliminary assessment of whether the results of a paper, if correct, are worth publishing. If so one of the associate editors reviews the paper: from the reviewer we expect to learn if the paper is understandable and coherent and - within reasonable bounds - the results are correct. We believe that long lags in publication and multiple demands for revision simply slow scientific progress. Our goal is to provide you a definitive answer within one month of submission. We give the editors one week to judge the overall contribution and if acceptable send your paper to an associate editor. We expect the associate editor to provide a more detailed evaluation within three weeks so that the editors can make a final decision before the month expires. In the (rare) case of a revision we allow four months and in the case of conditional acceptance we allow two months to submit the final version. In both cases we expect a cover letter explaining how you met the requirements. For conditional acceptance the editors will verify that the requirements were met. In the case of revision the original associate editor will do so. If the revision cannot be at least conditionally accepted it is rejected: there is no second revision.