Eduardo Mello , Will Jennings , Lawrence McKay , Oto Montagner
{"title":"Effects of a politician’s reputation for providing electoral clientelism: A theory with evidence from Brazil","authors":"Eduardo Mello , Will Jennings , Lawrence McKay , Oto Montagner","doi":"10.1016/j.electstud.2026.103043","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This article offers a new theory of how reputations for electoral clientelism affect voter behaviour. Existing accounts emphasise direct exchanges between candidates and clients, but often overlook how broader audiences evaluate these practices. We develop a formal model showing that voters’ preferences over clientelistic candidates are shaped by their trust in political institutions: when trust is low, voters—whether clients or not—may view clientelism as a credible signal of goodwill and effectiveness. When trust is high, they favour programmatic candidates instead. We test the model’s predictions through a conjoint survey experiment conducted with 2148 Brazilian voters. We find that reputations for clientelism increase electoral support, especially among citizens with lower institutional trust. The findings advance theories of clientelism and electoral accountability by incorporating public perceptions, not just private exchanges, into the strategic calculus of candidates and voters.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48188,"journal":{"name":"Electoral Studies","volume":"99 ","pages":"Article 103043"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7000,"publicationDate":"2026-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Electoral Studies","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379426000016","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2026/1/10 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article offers a new theory of how reputations for electoral clientelism affect voter behaviour. Existing accounts emphasise direct exchanges between candidates and clients, but often overlook how broader audiences evaluate these practices. We develop a formal model showing that voters’ preferences over clientelistic candidates are shaped by their trust in political institutions: when trust is low, voters—whether clients or not—may view clientelism as a credible signal of goodwill and effectiveness. When trust is high, they favour programmatic candidates instead. We test the model’s predictions through a conjoint survey experiment conducted with 2148 Brazilian voters. We find that reputations for clientelism increase electoral support, especially among citizens with lower institutional trust. The findings advance theories of clientelism and electoral accountability by incorporating public perceptions, not just private exchanges, into the strategic calculus of candidates and voters.
期刊介绍:
Electoral Studies is an international journal covering all aspects of voting, the central act in the democratic process. Political scientists, economists, sociologists, game theorists, geographers, contemporary historians and lawyers have common, and overlapping, interests in what causes voters to act as they do, and the consequences. Electoral Studies provides a forum for these diverse approaches. It publishes fully refereed papers, both theoretical and empirical, on such topics as relationships between votes and seats, and between election outcomes and politicians reactions; historical, sociological, or geographical correlates of voting behaviour; rational choice analysis of political acts, and critiques of such analyses.