China's Polluting Interregnum: Evidence From Power Vacancy of Local Leaders

Abstract

Power vacancies in local government leadership positions may have significant implications for the implementation and regulation of air pollution control policies. Using data from 271 prefecture-level cities in China from 2014 to 2017, we examine the causal effects of power vacancies on the effectiveness of air pollution control. The findings indicate that power vacancies, particularly the absence of party secretaries, have a substantial negative impact on the effectiveness of air pollution control efforts. Specifically, a 1-month vacancy in the party secretary position leads to a 0.572-unit decrease in the completion of air pollution control objectives. Furthermore, the underlying mechanisms show that the absence of a party secretary disrupts the balance of authority and accountability among local officials, leading to diminished efforts in executing environmental protection policies. In this scenario, local officials, driven by economic incentives, are more likely to approve high-polluting industrial registrations and relax pollution restrictions, which directly results in a 2.6% increase in the number of new high-polluting industrial enterprises and a 1% rise in NO₂ concentrations. This impact is more pronounced in regions with lower levels of economic development, weaker public environmental awareness and less developed marketisation.