Expert trustworthiness and the value-free ideal of science

Abstract

I examine critically a received view of expert trustworthiness and the value-free ideal of science. According to this view, to be epistemically trustworthy in the eyes of citizens, scientific experts should aim to be as neutral as possible with respect to moral and social values when they provide research-based knowledge and advice to different publics. This view is thought to be feasible and desirable for both epistemic and moral/political reasons. I challenge this view by arguing against three recent attempts to defend the legacy of the value-free ideal of science. An analysis of epistemic trustworthiness helps philosophers understand why moral and social values should guide scientific experts’ knowledge-sharing activities. It also helps understand which moral and social values are needed to build and maintain expert trustworthiness. However, it does not amount to a full-service account of the proper roles of non-epistemic values in science. The analysis offers merely a partial approach to the value management question.