Paying none, some or all? Between-subject random incentives and preferences towards risk and time

IF 2.2 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2026-01-01 Epub Date: 2025-12-02 DOI:10.1016/j.joep.2025.102870

Noémi Berlin , Emmanuel Kemel , Vincent Lenglin , Antoine Nebout

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In the context of risk and time preferences, the within-subject random incentive system (Within-RIS) is the standard real-incentive mechanism in economic experiments: each subject has one choice randomly selected for payment. In a variation, Within-RIS is applied to a fraction of subjects only: each subject has a probability

π

of being selected and has one choice randomly selected for payment. This paper assesses the validity of this mechanism called the hybrid random incentive system (Hybrid-RIS) by investigating if/how the selection probability affects elicited risk and time preferences. We report an experiment conducted with 335 subjects across four treatments, varying the selection probability to 0, 0.1, 0.5, and 1. Using raw data statistics and structural estimations of preference parameters, we find that elicited time preferences remain stable, while risk aversion is lower when the selection probability is null. However, there are no significant differences among the non-null selection probabilities. These findings suggest that Hybrid-RIS does not distort elicited risk and time preferences.

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不支付，部分还是全部？主体间随机激励和对风险和时间的偏好

在风险偏好和时间偏好的背景下，主体内随机激励系统（Within-RIS）是经济实验中标准的真实激励机制，即每个主体随机选择一个支付方式。在一种变化中，Within-RIS只应用于一小部分受试者：每个受试者被选中的概率为π，并且随机选择一个选项进行支付。本文通过研究选择概率是否/如何影响风险偏好和时间偏好来评估这种称为混合随机激励系统（hybrid - ris）的机制的有效性。我们报告了一项实验，对335名受试者进行了四种处理，选择概率分别为0、0.1、0.5和1。使用原始数据统计和偏好参数的结构估计，我们发现当选择概率为零时，引发的时间偏好保持稳定，而风险厌恶较低。然而，非零选择概率之间没有显著差异。这些发现表明Hybrid-RIS不会扭曲诱导的风险和时间偏好。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Psychology Multiple-

CiteScore

5.20

自引率

31.40%

发文量

审稿时长

63 days

期刊介绍： The Journal aims to present research that will improve understanding of behavioral, in particular psychological, aspects of economic phenomena and processes. The Journal seeks to be a channel for the increased interest in using behavioral science methods for the study of economic behavior, and so to contribute to better solutions of societal problems, by stimulating new approaches and new theorizing about economic affairs. Economic psychology as a discipline studies the psychological mechanisms that underlie economic behavior. It deals with preferences, judgments, choices, economic interaction, and factors influencing these, as well as the consequences of judgements and decisions for economic processes and phenomena. This includes the impact of economic institutions upon human behavior and well-being. Studies in economic psychology may relate to different levels of aggregation, from the household and the individual consumer to the macro level of whole nations. Economic behavior in connection with inflation, unemployment, taxation, economic development, as well as consumer information and economic behavior in the market place are thus among the fields of interest. The journal also encourages submissions dealing with social interaction in economic contexts, like bargaining, negotiation, or group decision-making. The Journal of Economic Psychology contains: (a) novel reports of empirical (including: experimental) research on economic behavior; (b) replications studies; (c) assessments of the state of the art in economic psychology; (d) articles providing a theoretical perspective or a frame of reference for the study of economic behavior; (e) articles explaining the implications of theoretical developments for practical applications; (f) book reviews; (g) announcements of meetings, conferences and seminars.