Land titling and political alternation: seeds of Mexico's drug war

IF 2.1 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Economica Pub Date : 2025-09-16 DOI:10.1111/ecca.70010
Luis Sanchez, Vassilis Sarantides
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The Mexican drug war has escalated dramatically since 2007, yet its roots lie in municipal turf wars of the 1990s and early 2000s involving the main drug-trafficking organizations operating in the country. We trace these turf wars to two concurrent shocks: the weakening of the PRI's long-standing dominance in local offices, and PROCEDE, the programme that converted PRI-dominated communal ejidos into individually titled parcels. By transforming untitled land into marketable property, PROCEDE made rural parcels far easier to acquire or extort. At the same time, opposition victories at municipal and state levels dismantled PRI-brokered protection networks, leaving incumbent cartels exposed. Together, marketable land and vanishing political cover created fertile ground for rival organizations to invade and clash. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we show that municipalities exposed to both shocks—the PROCEDE rollout and opposition victories—experienced a rise in organized-crime deaths during 1995–2006. The surge is strongest when an opposition mayor is elected in the same year that the governorship also turns against the PRI, signalling the collapse of protective networks. Cartel-presence data also reveal that these municipalities attract both first-time entrants and multiple rivals, confirming that violence stems from competition over newly contestable territories.

土地所有权和政治交替:墨西哥毒品战争的种子
自2007年以来,墨西哥的毒品战争急剧升级,但其根源在于20世纪90年代和21世纪初的市政地盘之争,涉及该国主要的贩毒组织。我们将这些地盘之争归结为两个同时发生的冲击:革命制度党长期以来在地方办公室的主导地位的削弱,以及将革命制度党主导的公共ejidos转变为独立命名的地块的程序。通过将无产权土地转化为可交易的财产,程序化程序使得农村地块更容易获得或敲诈。与此同时,反对派在市级和州级的胜利瓦解了pri斡旋的保护网络,使在位的卡特尔暴露无遗。可交易的土地和消失的政治掩护共同为敌对组织的入侵和冲突创造了肥沃的土壤。使用差异中的差异框架,我们表明,在1995年至2006年期间,受到程序法推出和反对派胜利这两种冲击的城市,有组织犯罪死亡人数有所上升。当反对派市长在同一年当选,而州长也转而反对革命制度党的时候,这种激增是最强烈的,这标志着保护网络的崩溃。卡特尔存在的数据还显示,这些城市既吸引了首次进入者,也吸引了多个竞争对手,这证实了暴力源于对新竞争领土的竞争。
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来源期刊
Economica
Economica ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
49
审稿时长
5 weeks
期刊介绍: Economica is an international journal devoted to research in all branches of economics. Theoretical and empirical articles are welcome from all parts of the international research community. Economica is a leading economics journal, appearing high in the published citation rankings. In addition to the main papers which make up each issue, there is an extensive review section, covering a wide range of recently published titles at all levels.
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