Why Cognitive Science Needs Phenomenology: Rethinking the Epistemology of Consciousness Through Intuitive Dualism

Abstract

Cognitive science needs phenomenology, not despite, but because of the epistemic challenges posed by consciousness. This article argues that the pervasive presence of intuitive dualism, the empirical cognitive tendency to distinguish the mental from physical, is a widespread and entrenched feature of human experience. Drawing on work in developmental psychology and cognitive anthropology, we suggest that first-person experience, often bracketed or marginalised in scientific accounts, must instead be treated as a legitimate source of epistemic access. The goal is in no way to return to metaphysical dualism but to recognise that the intuitively dualist subjective experience forms the data any science of consciousness must take seriously. Reframing the study of consciousness through phenomenological epistemology not only acknowledges the ontological stakes of mental phenomena but also realigns scientific inquiry with the lived realities it seeks to explain. This interdisciplinary rethinking offers a path forward for reconciling cognitive science, philosophy and the enduring puzzle of consciousness.