In-Group Versus Out-Group Preferences in Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment

IF 0.9 4区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Anwesha Mukherjee, Roman M. Sheremeta
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

In group conflicts, individuals often have diverse preferences, such as maximizing personal payoff, maximizing the group's payoff, or defeating rivals. When these preferences coexist, isolating their impact on conflict outcomes becomes challenging. To disentangle in-group and out-group preferences, we conduct a group contest experiment in which human in-group or out-group players are replaced with historical subjects to maintain strategic similarity. Our study aims to explore (i) the variation in effort in group conflicts due to in-group and out-group preferences and group cohesion, and (ii) how the impact of these preferences changes when the two groups have explicitly different categorical identities. Surprisingly, our results indicate an absence of overall treatment effects on effort levels. However, the presence of in-groups has heightened concerns about individual payoffs. When out-groups are introduced, these concerns are moderated by an additional focus on the group's payoffs. The negative effect of the in-group preferences and the positive effect of the out-group preferences are weaker when group members have a common categorical identity.

Abstract Image

群体冲突中的群体内偏好与群体外偏好:一项实验
在群体冲突中,个体往往有不同的偏好,如个人利益最大化,群体利益最大化,或击败对手。当这些偏好共存时,孤立它们对冲突结果的影响就变得具有挑战性。为了弄清群体内和群体外的偏好,我们进行了一项群体竞赛实验,在实验中,人类的群体内或群体外参与者被历史受试者取代,以保持策略相似性。本研究旨在探讨(i)群体内、群体外偏好和群体凝聚力对群体冲突努力的影响,以及(ii)当两个群体具有明显不同的类别认同时,这些偏好的影响是如何变化的。令人惊讶的是,我们的结果表明,在努力水平上,总体治疗效果是不存在的。然而,内部团体的存在加剧了人们对个人回报的担忧。当引入外群体时,这些担忧会被对群体收益的额外关注所缓和。当群体成员具有共同的范畴认同时,群体内偏好的消极作用和群体外偏好的积极作用较弱。
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来源期刊
自引率
36.40%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: As the official journal of the Association of Public Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economic Theory (JPET) is dedicated to stimulating research in the rapidly growing field of public economics. Submissions are judged on the basis of their creativity and rigor, and the Journal imposes neither upper nor lower boundary on the complexity of the techniques employed. This journal focuses on such topics as public goods, local public goods, club economies, externalities, taxation, growth, public choice, social and public decision making, voting, market failure, regulation, project evaluation, equity, and political systems.
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