Bilal Al Dah , Mustafa A. Dah , Konstantinos Stathopoulos
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
Recent diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives have resulted in significant board refreshment, specifically in the characteristics and qualities of board members across various dimensions. To facilitate these changes, U.S. boardrooms are increasingly appointing inexperienced rookie directors. Our findings indicate that rookie refreshment enhances board monitoring effectiveness, as evidenced by improved CEO turnover–performance sensitivity, better CEO incentives, and higher earnings quality. While rookie refreshment does not enhance the board's advising capacity, it does not hinder it either. These findings challenge DEI critics who argue that rookie appointments result in inefficient firm-director matching, thereby hampering corporate governance. Moreover, we show that boards continue to benefit from seasoned director refreshment to improve advising effectiveness, as reflected in firms' investment efficiency and acquisition activities and performance. Overall, we posit that rookie directors enhance board effectiveness when their presence refreshes the board's composition relative to its prior attributes.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.