{"title":"Personhood and Community: African Philosophical Perspectives.","authors":"Jonathan Bayuo","doi":"10.1111/nup.70052","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The interplay between personhood and community anchors philosophical enquiry into the essence of identity and selfhood, interrogating how societal frameworks both shape and are shaped by individuals. Despite advancements in these philosophical discourses, the notions of personhood and community remain underexplored in the African philosophical worldviews. As a starting point, this paper sought to remedy the underrepresentation of African philosophical views on personhood and community in global philosophical discourse. Rooted in the works of John Mbiti, Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu, African philosophical traditions emphasise that personhood is cultivated through ethical engagement, social participation and adherence to cultural norms. Mbiti posits that personhood is not inherent at birth, requiring rites of passage and active integration into communal life for its realisation, encapsulated in his axiom, 'I am because we are'. Menkiti extends this, framing personhood as an 'ontological progression' towards moral maturity, where communal norms and responsibilities shape one's identity. Gyekye, while acknowledging an inherent baseline of personhood, argues it is augmented through communal practices, critiquing exclusionary views that deny moral status to children. Wiredu introduces a dialectical model, where personhood is socially conferred through language, ethics and reciprocity, yet remains vulnerable to loss through moral failure, necessitating communal restoration. Collectively, these thinkers reject Cartesian dualism, advocating an approach that highlights interconnectedness and relational autonomy, holism, dynamism, communal identity, ethical mediation and communal healing practices. Divergences emerge between Mbiti and Menkiti's emphasis on earned personhood and Gyekye and Wiredu's recognition of inherent moral worth, reflecting nuanced debates within African communitarianism. These perspectives carry profound implications for healthcare, urging a shift from biomedical individualism to practices honouring cultural, spiritual and communal dimensions. In an era of global diversity, these thoughts offer a transformative framework for holistic, dignified healthcare, where healing transcends physical treatment.</p>","PeriodicalId":49724,"journal":{"name":"Nursing Philosophy","volume":"26 4","pages":"e70052"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Nursing Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nup.70052","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"NURSING","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The interplay between personhood and community anchors philosophical enquiry into the essence of identity and selfhood, interrogating how societal frameworks both shape and are shaped by individuals. Despite advancements in these philosophical discourses, the notions of personhood and community remain underexplored in the African philosophical worldviews. As a starting point, this paper sought to remedy the underrepresentation of African philosophical views on personhood and community in global philosophical discourse. Rooted in the works of John Mbiti, Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye and Kwasi Wiredu, African philosophical traditions emphasise that personhood is cultivated through ethical engagement, social participation and adherence to cultural norms. Mbiti posits that personhood is not inherent at birth, requiring rites of passage and active integration into communal life for its realisation, encapsulated in his axiom, 'I am because we are'. Menkiti extends this, framing personhood as an 'ontological progression' towards moral maturity, where communal norms and responsibilities shape one's identity. Gyekye, while acknowledging an inherent baseline of personhood, argues it is augmented through communal practices, critiquing exclusionary views that deny moral status to children. Wiredu introduces a dialectical model, where personhood is socially conferred through language, ethics and reciprocity, yet remains vulnerable to loss through moral failure, necessitating communal restoration. Collectively, these thinkers reject Cartesian dualism, advocating an approach that highlights interconnectedness and relational autonomy, holism, dynamism, communal identity, ethical mediation and communal healing practices. Divergences emerge between Mbiti and Menkiti's emphasis on earned personhood and Gyekye and Wiredu's recognition of inherent moral worth, reflecting nuanced debates within African communitarianism. These perspectives carry profound implications for healthcare, urging a shift from biomedical individualism to practices honouring cultural, spiritual and communal dimensions. In an era of global diversity, these thoughts offer a transformative framework for holistic, dignified healthcare, where healing transcends physical treatment.
期刊介绍:
Nursing Philosophy provides a forum for discussion of philosophical issues in nursing. These focus on questions relating to the nature of nursing and to the phenomena of key relevance to it. For example, any understanding of what nursing is presupposes some conception of just what nurses are trying to do when they nurse. But what are the ends of nursing? Are they to promote health, prevent disease, promote well-being, enhance autonomy, relieve suffering, or some combination of these? How are these ends are to be met? What kind of knowledge is needed in order to nurse? Practical, theoretical, aesthetic, moral, political, ''intuitive'' or some other?
Papers that explore other aspects of philosophical enquiry and analysis of relevance to nursing (and any other healthcare or social care activity) are also welcome and might include, but not be limited to, critical discussions of the work of nurse theorists who have advanced philosophical claims (e.g., Benner, Benner and Wrubel, Carper, Schrok, Watson, Parse and so on) as well as critical engagement with philosophers (e.g., Heidegger, Husserl, Kuhn, Polanyi, Taylor, MacIntyre and so on) whose work informs health care in general and nursing in particular.