Strategic state violence and migration in conflict

Abstract

Governments routinely wage civil conflicts in ways that disrupt civilians' lives and livelihoods, creating harmful externalities like internal displacement. Both fighting and displacement hinder economic activity, jeopardizing popular support for governments and reducing the future gains of governance. How do states fight when using force induces migration and thus risks popular discontent? I model a conflict where government efforts to control territory spur displacement, creating economic disruption that can spark tension between displaced civilians and government supporters. The risk of losing popular support leads the government to modify its tactics. While the government could mitigate the disruptive consequences of displacement by fighting less, I find another, more troubling, strategy. Governments may engage in preemptive violence to prevent migration. Moreover, economic downturns exacerbate migration incentives and, I find, can also increase violence against civilians. Governments anticipating displacement fight more intense conflicts today to see relatively less migration in the future.