{"title":"Efficient forward trade fosters innovation, investment, and resiliency","authors":"Peter Cramton , Axel Ockenfels","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105158","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>We propose a forward energy market design for Germany's electricity sector as an alternative to traditional capacity mechanisms. Drawing on two decades of U.S. experience, we point out the disadvantages of centralized capacity auctions and decentralized capacity obligations. Our forward energy market design enables transparent trading of granular energy products up to 48 months in advance through hourly batch auctions. In this design, load-serving entities have purchase obligations that increase from 0% to 100% of the realized load as the delivery date approaches. Unlike traditional capacity markets, which perpetuate spot market inefficiencies, our mechanism strengthens price signals, improves risk management, and enhances system resilience by providing efficient price discovery and clear investment signals. It also offers a robust, no-regret pathway to fostering innovation and demand flexibility, which are crucial for the energy transition.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"180 ","pages":"Article 105158"},"PeriodicalIF":2.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292125002089","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"2025/10/1 0:00:00","PubModel":"Epub","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We propose a forward energy market design for Germany's electricity sector as an alternative to traditional capacity mechanisms. Drawing on two decades of U.S. experience, we point out the disadvantages of centralized capacity auctions and decentralized capacity obligations. Our forward energy market design enables transparent trading of granular energy products up to 48 months in advance through hourly batch auctions. In this design, load-serving entities have purchase obligations that increase from 0% to 100% of the realized load as the delivery date approaches. Unlike traditional capacity markets, which perpetuate spot market inefficiencies, our mechanism strengthens price signals, improves risk management, and enhances system resilience by providing efficient price discovery and clear investment signals. It also offers a robust, no-regret pathway to fostering innovation and demand flexibility, which are crucial for the energy transition.
期刊介绍:
The European Economic Review (EER) started publishing in 1969 as the first research journal specifically aiming to contribute to the development and application of economics as a science in Europe. As a broad-based professional and international journal, the EER welcomes submissions of applied and theoretical research papers in all fields of economics. The aim of the EER is to contribute to the development of the science of economics and its applications, as well as to improve communication between academic researchers, teachers and policy makers across the European continent and beyond.