Navigating uncertain generation: The impact of regulation on distributed photovoltaic green electricity trading market participation

IF 14.2 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Yong-Heng Shi , Tao Zhao , Bai-Chen Xie , Peng Hao
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Distributed photovoltaic systems play increasingly important roles in the power mix. China is actively promoting the integration of aggregated photovoltaics into the green electricity trading market. However, challenges related to undersupply and oversupply, stemming from uncertain generation, hinder market integration. To address these issues, China has implemented alternative regulatory mechanisms designed to guide generation schedules and mitigate forecasting deviations. It remains to be seen how these mechanisms will promote economic benefits and social welfare. This paper proposes a bi-level differential game model to investigate the effects of three mechanisms: fixed penalties, flexible penalties, and nearby consumption. The results show that: (i) Imposing or increasing undersupply penalties results in a strictly low renewable energy commitment, and distributed energy aggregation can mitigate this detrimental effect; (ii) Reducing the penalty intensity improves social welfare and a moderate fixed penalty helps to increase profits for generators; (iii) Generators can strategically increase their renewable energy commitment to manipulate the penalty under a market-based flexible penalty mechanism; (iv) Generators benefit from the resale of excess generation in a secondary market, but this practice may lead to a loss of social welfare when facing high levelized costs. In addition to cost reductions, a combination of punishment and nearby consumption can be applied to cope with generation uncertainty.
导航不确定发电:监管对分布式光伏绿色电力交易市场参与的影响
分布式光伏系统在电力结构中扮演着越来越重要的角色。中国正在积极推动光伏发电纳入绿色电力交易市场。然而,由于不确定的产生,与供应不足和供过于求相关的挑战阻碍了市场一体化。为了解决这些问题,中国已经实施了旨在指导发电计划和减轻预测偏差的替代监管机制。这些机制将如何促进经济效益和社会福利还有待观察。本文提出了一个双水平微分博弈模型,考察了固定处罚、灵活处罚和就近消费三种机制的影响。结果表明:(1)施加或增加供应不足惩罚导致可再生能源承诺严格降低,分布式能源聚集可以减轻这种不利影响;减少惩罚强度可以改善社会福利,适度的固定罚款有助于增加发电机的利润;发电机可以战略性地增加其可再生能源承诺,以便在基于市场的灵活惩罚机制下操纵惩罚;发电机因在二级市场转售多余的电力而受益,但这种做法在面临高昂的成本时可能导致社会福利的丧失。除了降低成本,惩罚和就近消费的结合也可以用来应对发电的不确定性。
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来源期刊
Energy Economics
Energy Economics ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
18.60
自引率
12.50%
发文量
524
期刊介绍: Energy Economics is a field journal that focuses on energy economics and energy finance. It covers various themes including the exploitation, conversion, and use of energy, markets for energy commodities and derivatives, regulation and taxation, forecasting, environment and climate, international trade, development, and monetary policy. The journal welcomes contributions that utilize diverse methods such as experiments, surveys, econometrics, decomposition, simulation models, equilibrium models, optimization models, and analytical models. It publishes a combination of papers employing different methods to explore a wide range of topics. The journal's replication policy encourages the submission of replication studies, wherein researchers reproduce and extend the key results of original studies while explaining any differences. Energy Economics is indexed and abstracted in several databases including Environmental Abstracts, Fuel and Energy Abstracts, Social Sciences Citation Index, GEOBASE, Social & Behavioral Sciences, Journal of Economic Literature, INSPEC, and more.
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