Melanie B Fessinger,Jacqueline Katzman,Melanie Close,Margaret Bull Kovera
{"title":"Interrogation tactics may have downstream consequences on innocent and guilty defendants' plea decisions.","authors":"Melanie B Fessinger,Jacqueline Katzman,Melanie Close,Margaret Bull Kovera","doi":"10.1037/lhb0000635","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"OBJECTIVE\r\nWe examined whether interrogation tactics that imply leniency (i.e., minimization) or exaggerate seriousness and incriminating evidence (i.e., maximization) have downstream consequences on innocent and guilty defendants' plea decisions.\r\n\r\nHYPOTHESES\r\nWe predicted that (a) participants interrogated using minimization and maximization tactics would plead guilty more often than would those interrogated using control tactics; (b) guilty participants would plead guilty more often than would innocent participants; (c) the effect of interrogation tactics on plea decisions would be driven by perceived trial prospects; and (d) the effect of guilt on plea decisions would be driven by anxiety.\r\n\r\nMETHOD\r\nParticipants (N = 262) took part in a plea decision-making task in which they were either innocent or guilty of cheating and interrogated using control, minimization, or maximization tactics. They were then told they could contest the accusation in front of a board (proxy for trial) or admit to it for a reduced punishment (proxy for plea). They decided how to plead, evaluated the likelihood they would have been convicted by the board, and estimated the likely punishment they would have received if convicted by the board. They also rated their state anxiety.\r\n\r\nRESULTS\r\nAs predicted, guilty participants pleaded guilty more often than did innocent participants (OR = 7.99). However, interrogation tactics differentially affected innocent and guilty participants. Compared to control tactics, minimization significantly reduced guilty pleas among innocent participants (p = .02, Cohen's h = 0.49) but not among guilty participants (p = .70, h = 0.09). In contrast, maximization significantly reduced guilty pleas among innocent participants (p = .04, h = 0.44) but significantly increased guilty pleas among guilty participants (p = .047, h = 0.41).\r\n\r\nCONCLUSIONS\r\nInterrogation tactics can have consequences outside of the interrogation context by affecting innocent and guilty defendants' later plea decisions. Such findings raise questions about the continued use of these tactics in real-world interrogations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).","PeriodicalId":48230,"journal":{"name":"Law and Human Behavior","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.2000,"publicationDate":"2025-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law and Human Behavior","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1037/lhb0000635","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
OBJECTIVE
We examined whether interrogation tactics that imply leniency (i.e., minimization) or exaggerate seriousness and incriminating evidence (i.e., maximization) have downstream consequences on innocent and guilty defendants' plea decisions.
HYPOTHESES
We predicted that (a) participants interrogated using minimization and maximization tactics would plead guilty more often than would those interrogated using control tactics; (b) guilty participants would plead guilty more often than would innocent participants; (c) the effect of interrogation tactics on plea decisions would be driven by perceived trial prospects; and (d) the effect of guilt on plea decisions would be driven by anxiety.
METHOD
Participants (N = 262) took part in a plea decision-making task in which they were either innocent or guilty of cheating and interrogated using control, minimization, or maximization tactics. They were then told they could contest the accusation in front of a board (proxy for trial) or admit to it for a reduced punishment (proxy for plea). They decided how to plead, evaluated the likelihood they would have been convicted by the board, and estimated the likely punishment they would have received if convicted by the board. They also rated their state anxiety.
RESULTS
As predicted, guilty participants pleaded guilty more often than did innocent participants (OR = 7.99). However, interrogation tactics differentially affected innocent and guilty participants. Compared to control tactics, minimization significantly reduced guilty pleas among innocent participants (p = .02, Cohen's h = 0.49) but not among guilty participants (p = .70, h = 0.09). In contrast, maximization significantly reduced guilty pleas among innocent participants (p = .04, h = 0.44) but significantly increased guilty pleas among guilty participants (p = .047, h = 0.41).
CONCLUSIONS
Interrogation tactics can have consequences outside of the interrogation context by affecting innocent and guilty defendants' later plea decisions. Such findings raise questions about the continued use of these tactics in real-world interrogations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
期刊介绍:
Law and Human Behavior, the official journal of the American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the American Psychological Association, is a multidisciplinary forum for the publication of articles and discussions of issues arising out of the relationships between human behavior and the law, our legal system, and the legal process. This journal publishes original research, reviews of past research, and theoretical studies from professionals in criminal justice, law, psychology, sociology, psychiatry, political science, education, communication, and other areas germane to the field.