Dynamic strategy update mechanisms facilitate cooperation

Abstract

In offshore aquaculture, fishermen determine their farming methods based on either their own and their neighbors' previous payoff information or their personal historical payoff data. The available farming methods include environmentally friendly practices and environmentally damaging practices. Typically, they decide which information to use for updating their farming strategies based on whether their current payoff meets a satisfactory value. This study employs a social dilemma game model to investigate this issue, where the two farming methods correspond to cooperative and defecting strategies, respectively. The utilization of payoff information reflects different strategy update mechanisms, and it is assumed that individuals decide whether to retain or switch their update mechanisms based on whether their payoff meets the satisfaction value. The results indicate that dynamic changes in strategy update mechanisms can effectively promote cooperation, favoring the adoption of environmentally friendly farming practices. Moreover, when the satisfaction value is either relatively low or high, more individuals tend to adopt such sustainable farming methods.