Between truth and authenticity in episodic memory: the case for veridicalism

Abstract

What are the accuracy conditions of episodic memories? On a standard view introduced by Bernecker (2010), there are two accuracy conditions that an episodic memory must meet: truth and authenticity. An episodic memory is true if it is accurate with regard to the remembered event; an episodic memory is authentic if it is accurate with regard to one’s original experience of this event. Recently, however, this standard authenticist view has been put under pressure by theorists who claim that the authenticity condition should be abandoned. Here, we provide a response to this recent anti-authenticist trend, which we call veridicalism. Veridicalism offers a moderate reply to worries about authenticity and offers an original account of the content of episodic memory. We claim that both truth and authenticity can be accuracy conditions for our memories, but their inclusion depends on the content of memory, which in turn depends on the context of remembering. To vindicate this veridicalist claim, we contribute both to the authenticity debate, by showing that recent anti-authenticist arguments fail, and to the delineation debate, by arguing that the content of episodic memories is delineated in a context-sensitive way, which thereby motivates the moderate character of our authenticism.