Social Vulnerability, Equity, and Representative Bureaucracy: Evidence From the Allocation of Disaster Assistance Fund in the United States

Abstract

Prior research has found disparities in the allocation of disaster relief funds in the U.S. However, little attention has been paid to the role of bureaucracy in public assistance (PA) fund allocation that possibly contributes to these inequalities. This study examines whether minority bureaucratic representation promotes the allocation of PA funds in counties with more socially vulnerable populations. Multilevel modeling is utilized to test the hypotheses, using a panel dataset of 8608 county‐year observations from U.S. counties for the years 2006 to 2019. The results show that the level of disaster relief funding does not increase in proportion to disaster damage for socially vulnerable communities to the same extent as it does for less vulnerable communities. In addition, in highly vulnerable counties, PA funds relative to damage tend to be allocated at a higher rate as the share of minority officials increases, narrowing the existing gap between high‐ and low‐vulnerability counties.