Intellectual property protection, green technology innovation, and energy transition: An evolutionary game analysis

Abstract

This paper develops an evolutionary game model of heterogeneous firms operating under an intellectual property (IP) protection regime to analyze the co-evolutionary mechanisms and micro-level decision thresholds through which IP protection facilitates green technological innovation and energy transition. The results indicate that achieving a desirable equilibrium of effective protection, active innovation, and accelerated transition relies on the coordinated implementation of three policy instruments: IP protection, innovation subsidies, and environmental regulation. The absence or misalignment of any policy tool may lead the system to an undesirable equilibrium marked by transition stagnation. An optimal threshold for IP enforcement intensity is identified. This threshold is negatively correlated with enforcement costs at the institutional level but positively correlated with the economic benefits and life cycle of green technologies at the technological level. The follower firm exhibits the slowest innovation response, and its sustained innovation depends on a compensatory policy mix that combines IP enforcement with innovation subsidies. While higher prices for green technologies incentivize R&D, they also hinder diffusion. This study fills a theoretical gap in the literature concerning the multi-agent interaction mechanisms guiding energy transition through innovation institutions and provides a theoretical foundation for constructing a green-oriented IP policy system.