Endogenous task allocation and intrafirm bargaining

IF 1.8 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2025-09-24 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112630

Martyna Marczak , Thomas Beissinger

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We develop a model that incorporates task-based production into a matching model with intrafirm wage bargaining. Unlike in existing task-based models, the representative firm derives the optimal task allocation as a function of capital and labor, rather than relative factor prices. Embedding this mechanism in a model with strategic employment choice, we show how the properties of task-level technology affect the extent of overhiring.

查看原文本刊更多论文

内生任务分配与企业内部议价

我们开发了一个模型，将基于任务的生产纳入到与企业内部工资谈判的匹配模型中。与现有的基于任务的模型不同，代表性企业将最优任务分配作为资本和劳动力的函数，而不是相对要素价格的函数。将这一机制嵌入到一个具有战略就业选择的模型中，我们展示了任务级技术的属性如何影响过度招聘的程度。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.