Concavity of order statistics in sample size: Implications for auction design

IF 1.8 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2025-09-23 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112628

Mitchell Watt

引用次数: 0

Abstract

I show that the expected

k^{th}

-highest order statistic from a monotone hazard rate distribution is concave in sample size. In independent private value auctions with convex marketing costs, this ensures that the seller’s objective is concave, yielding a finite optimum.

查看原文本刊更多论文

订单统计在样本量上的凹性：对拍卖设计的启示

我证明了单调风险率分布的期望第k最高阶统计量在样本量上是凹的。在具有凸营销成本的独立私人价值拍卖中，这确保了卖方的目标是凹的，从而产生有限的最优。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.