The multiple generator hypothesis of consciousness.

Abstract

It is well known that in interdisciplinary consciousness studies there are various competing hypotheses about the neural correlate(s) of consciousness (NCCs). Much contemporary work is dedicated to determining which of these hypotheses is right (or the weaker claim is to be preferred). The prevalent working assumption is that one of the competing hypotheses is correct, and the remaining hypotheses misdescribe the phenomenon in some critical manner and their associated purported empirical evidence will eventually be explained away. In contrast to this, we propose that each hypothesis-simultaneously with its competitors-may be right and its associated evidence be genuine evidence of NCCs. To account for this, we develop the multiple generator hypothesis (MGH) based on a distinction between principles and generators. The former denotes ways consciousness can be brought about and the latter how these are implemented in physical systems. We explicate and delineate the hypothesis and give examples of aspects of consciousness studies where the MGH is applicable and relevant. Finally, to show that it is promising we show the MGH has implications which give rise to novel questions or aspects to consider for the field of consciousness studies.