CEO tenure: Evidence from U.S. public firms

Abstract

This study investigates the determinants of CEO tenure in U.S. public firms using a survival analysis framework. Using a dataset of 4833 CEO tenures from 2445 firms (1992–2018), the analysis employs a Cox proportional hazards model to examine how CEO traits, internal promotions, and firm financial characteristics influence turnover. CEOs in the sample typically start at age 52 and exit around age 59, serving an average tenure of 7.6 years. Only 4 % of the CEOs are female. A substantial number remain in office beyond age 66, suggesting that many firms permit executives to continue serving past conventional retirement ages. Survival analysis shows that older CEOs are more likely to retire voluntarily and less likely to be dismissed, consistent with career life-cycle patterns. Internal appointments are associated with substantially lower risks of both forced and voluntary turnover, reflecting reduced information asymmetry and potential entrenchment effects. Among firm-level factors, higher intangible assets and financial losses increase turnover likelihood, whereas greater leverage stabilizes tenure. Turnover patterns also vary by industry: regulated sectors experience fewer dismissals, while technology sectors show greater forced turnover. Overall, the findings suggest that observable CEO and firm characteristics at the time of appointment shape the baseline conditions of the CEO–firm relationship and provide predictive signals about turnover risk and tenure duration.