An evolutionary multi-stage public-private cooperation framework for emergency supply reserves with corporate reputation considerations

Abstract

The timely supply of emergency supplies is a critical safeguard for disaster response and post-disaster recovery. With the increasing post-disaster demand for supplies, relying solely on government reserves has become insufficient to meet emergency needs, making collaboration with enterprises an essential solution. However, the specific mechanisms of government-enterprise collaboration in emergency supplies reserves require further investigation. This study employs evolutionary game theory (EGT), integrates corporate social responsibility (CSR), and incorporates reputational benefits into the analysis. A two-stage dynamic game model is constructed to systematically analyze the strategic evolution process and stabilization mechanisms between governments and enterprises during collaboration. The Collaboration Intention Formation (CIF) stage focuses on enterprise participation willingness and its determinants, while the Collaboration Deepening and Optimization (CDO) stage examines the dynamic evolution of government incentive strategies and enterprise cooperation patterns during sustained collaboration. The findings reveal that enterprise participation is directly driven by cost-benefit tradeoffs and indirectly influenced by internal and external factors. Stable and in-depth collaboration depends on the interaction of strategic choices and behavioral feedback mechanisms. Through model-based analysis and numerical simulations, this study identifies key variables influencing equilibrium stability and proposes policy recommendations to optimize emergency supply reserve systems. These results provide theoretical and practical guidance for enhancing the efficiency of government-enterprise collaboration in emergency management.