Vulnerability-based and Risk-Aware Honeynet Deployment Framework in Cyber-Physical Power Systems

Abstract

Honeynets are commonly employed to enhance network security. However, traditional honeynet deployment strategies lack quantitative assessment of cyber-physical cascading failures, limiting their effectiveness in mitigating chain reactions triggered by attacks. To address this limitation, this paper proposes an integrated defense framework that combines honeynet technology with Cyber-Physical Power Systems (CPPS) to counteract the impact of availability attacks. A static honeynet model based on node vulnerability is developed, incorporating features from both the information and physical layers to guide deployment. Additionally, a dynamic honeynet model based on node risk is proposed, and its protective performance across both layers is analyzed. The results demonstrate that the proposed approach significantly outperforms traditional honeynet strategies, offering improved defense capabilities. Through simulation experiments under resource constraints, the proposed method is shown to reduce load loss rates after availability attacks, enhance the residual connectivity of the information layer, and increase the total generator output. Furthermore, the defense effectiveness is maintained under varying attack intensities.