Command verification and cyber-resilience enhancement for an LFC system: A signal-temporal-logic framework

Abstract

Owing to the intricate interplay between cyber and physical systems, the real-time control of power systems is subject to exposure to a spectrum of complex and diverse cyber risks. The endogenous risks from control systems, specifically within black-box control systems, are particularly critical because power systems increasingly incorporate heterogeneous control systems, thus highlighting the importance of addressing cybersecurity issues. This paper addresses the anomalies pertaining to control commands, with a specific focus on the frequency control-system scenario. Using the signal monitoring approach named signal temporal logic, we propose a cybersecurity framework for an LFC (Load Frequency Control) system that introduces a data-driven model to achieve online formalized command verification; further, using the verification model, we design a resilient control algorithm to mitigate the effects of frequency anomalies caused by erroneous commands. Our simulation results of a New England 39-bus system with ten generators affirm the capability of our approach in ensuring error-free control commands and preventing frequency anomalies.