A three-party dynamic evolutionary game for efficient use of rural collective operational construction land

Abstract

The behavioural choices of stakeholders play a critical role in utilisation of collective operational construction land (COCL) and sustainable development of rural industries. This study considers the effects of government support and mutually beneficial cooperation between villages and enterprises on COCL use. A three-party game model involving the government, enterprises, and village collectives is constructed to analyse the strategies and evolutionary behaviours of each party, ultimately identifying three equilibrium points. Based on a simulation analysis of COCL marketisation cases in China, the results indicate that government support is effective in the early stages of COCL use but gradually loses its positive impact over time. Key factors influencing efficient COCL use include the severity of government penalties for enterprises’ non-compliant behaviour and the synergistic innovation benefits of village-enterprise cooperation. Efficient utilisation of COCL is a continuous dynamic process. The government can effectively deter and regulate enterprise behaviour by increasing penalty amounts, thereby safeguarding the rights and interests of village collectives.