Christopher Gust, Edward Herbst, David López-Salido
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
We model private-sector expectations in a finite-horizon-planning framework: households and firms have limited foresight when making spending, saving, and pricing decisions. In this setting, contrary to standard New Keynesian (NK) models, we show that an “inflation scare” problem can arise in which agents’ longer-run inflation expectations deviate persistently from a central bank’s inflation target. We characterize optimal time-consistent monetary policy when there is uncertainty about the planning horizons of private sector agents and a risk of inflation scares. We show how risk-management considerations modify the optimal “leaning-against-the-wind” principle in the NK literature with a novel, additional preemptive motive to avert inflation scares.
期刊介绍:
The profession has witnessed over the past twenty years a remarkable expansion of research activities bearing on problems in the broader field of monetary economics. The strong interest in monetary analysis has been increasingly matched in recent years by the growing attention to the working and structure of financial institutions. The role of various institutional arrangements, the consequences of specific changes in banking structure and the welfare aspects of structural policies have attracted an increasing interest in the profession. There has also been a growing attention to the operation of credit markets and to various aspects in the behavior of rates of return on assets. The Journal of Monetary Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of this research.