Corruption and accountability: Electoral systems, vote choice, and voter expectations for political parties

Abstract

Why do some politicians’ careers survive political scandals while others are unable to recover? In this research note, we consider the critical role of electoral systems. We argue that in candidate-centered electoral systems, where voters cast their ballots for individual candidates (e.g., single member districts)—rather than political parties (e.g., closed-list proportional representation)—voters are more likely to hold candidates accountable for corruption at the ballot box. By contrast, in party-centered electoral systems, voters are likely to shift the responsibility to the party. Further, we anticipate voter expectations of party accountability are heightened when removing a candidate is relatively low-cost to the party. To assess how electoral systems influence accountability in the context of corruption, we analyze data from a survey experiment conducted in Taiwan—a democracy with a mixed-member majoritarian system with parallel voting. This context allows us to hold constant cultural and political factors that may otherwise influence outcomes, while manipulating the electoral system. We find voters are more likely to hold candidates directly accountable in candidate-centered systems, regardless of partisan preferences. Results regarding party expectations are less conclusive, with only a suggestion of expectations of party accountability in party-centered systems, when the candidate in questions is less competitive.