Optimization of agricultural water price setting strategy and government subsidy mechanisms based on game analysis

IF 6.5 1区 农林科学 Q1 AGRONOMY
Xing Yang, Miao Hou, Wenye Zhang, Yan Ju, Zhihuan Wang
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Optimizing water resource management to promote water conservation requires coordinated water pricing and government subsidies that ensure both irrigation system reliability and farmers’ compliance with water quotas, while avoiding increases in farmers’ financial burdens. This study develops a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework that incorporates operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, water price approaches, and the payoffs and constraints of both government and farmers to analyze their strategic interactions under different scenarios, with particular emphasis on {S, C} and {S, E}. Here, S represents a sufficient government subsidy that fully covers O&M costs; C indicates farmers comply with water quotas; and E indicates farmers exceed water quotas. Using 13 irrigation districts located in the 13 prefecture-level cities of Jiangsu Province as a case study, the framework is applied to examine two periods, 2013–2015 and 2021–2023. Both the theoretical water pricing strategies and the actual strategies implemented by local governments are compared to identify gaps and their underlying causes. Results show that the provincial average water price was approximately 0.1 yuan (Chinese yuan, RMB) per cubic meter, and that subsidies generally kept farmers’ water fee burden within affordable limits. Actual subsidies were generally lower than theoretical levels, indicating constraints in government willingness to provide full support. In 2013–2015, the actual proportion of water fees borne by the government (APG) averaged 74.9 %, 65.2 %, and 43.1 % in southern, central, and northern Jiangsu, respectively; in 2021–2023, these values were 73.0 %, 62.0 %, and 41.2 %. Despite improved fiscal capacity, governments’ willingness to provide subsidies declined, partly due to the increase in per capita agricultural GDP (AGDPpc), which encompassed income from non-agricultural sources. Nonetheless, APG was significantly and positively correlated with regional per capita GDP (GDPpc) and agricultural per capita GDP (AGDPpc) in both periods. Per-mu irrigation water use (1 ha = 15 mu) decreased from 739–875 m3/mu in 2013–2015, exceeding quota limits, to 522–608 m3/mu in 2021–2023, generally within quota limits. This trend reflects a shift from the {S, E} scenario of high water consumption to the {S, C} scenario of sustainable, quota-compliant irrigation in Jiangsu.
基于博弈分析的农业水价制定策略与政府补贴机制优化
优化水资源管理以促进节约用水,需要协调水价和政府补贴,以确保灌溉系统的可靠性和农民遵守用水配额,同时避免增加农民的财政负担。本研究建立了一个非合作博弈论框架,将运营和维护(O&;M)成本、水价方法以及政府和农民的收益和约束纳入其中,分析了不同情景下政府和农民的战略互动,特别强调了{S, C}和{S, E}。在这里,S代表足够的政府补贴,完全覆盖O&;M成本;C表示农民遵守用水配额;E表示农民超过了用水配额。以江苏省13个地级市的13个灌区为例,应用该框架考察了2013-2015年和2021-2023年两个时期。通过对理论水价策略和地方政府实际水价策略的比较,找出差距及其原因。结果表明,全省平均水价约为每立方米0.1元(人民币),补贴总体上使农民的水费负担保持在可承受范围内。实际补贴普遍低于理论水平,表明政府提供全面支持的意愿受到限制。2013-2015年,苏南、苏中、苏北地区政府实际承担水费比例分别为74.9% %、65.2% %和43.1% %;2021-2023年,这些数值分别为73.0 %、62.0 %和41.2 %。尽管财政能力有所提高,但政府提供补贴的意愿有所下降,部分原因是包括非农业来源收入在内的人均农业GDP (AGDPpc)的增加。然而,在这两个时期,APG与地区人均GDP (GDPpc)和农业人均GDP (AGDPpc)显著正相关。每亩灌溉用水量(1 ha = 15亩)从2013-2015年的739-875 m3/亩超过限额,下降到2021-2023年的522-608 m3/亩,基本在限额范围内。这一趋势反映了江苏从高耗水量{S, E}情景向可持续、符合配额的灌溉{S, C}情景的转变。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Agricultural Water Management
Agricultural Water Management 农林科学-农艺学
CiteScore
12.10
自引率
14.90%
发文量
648
审稿时长
4.9 months
期刊介绍: Agricultural Water Management publishes papers of international significance relating to the science, economics, and policy of agricultural water management. In all cases, manuscripts must address implications and provide insight regarding agricultural water management.
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