Comments on Miriam Schleifer McCormick’s Belief as Emotion

Abstract

In this paper, I examine Miriam Schleifer McCormick’s novel theory that belief is fundamentally an emotion, combining cognitive and conative elements. I focus on three key aspects of Schleifer McCormick’s view: that the formal object of belief is accuracy rather than truth, that some disputed mental states (such as political ideologies) are genuine beliefs, and that belief requires a commitment that is compatible with doubt. I raise three concerns with these elements of Schleifer McCormick’s theory. First, accuracy as the formal object of belief does not explain variations in belief intensity as Schleifer McCormick contends it would. Second, one can defend doxasticism about political ideology more economically without adopting the Belief as Emotion view. Third, the relationship between commitments and beliefs requires further clarification regarding their ontological priority within Schleifer McCormick’s framework.