{"title":"The Fallacy of Unbeatable Force","authors":"Roberto Pizarro Contreras","doi":"10.1007/s10503-025-09666-z","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This article aims to characterize the fallacy of unbeatable force as an argument whose flawed structure grants an illusion of invulnerability to a phenomenon or entity whose power is perceived in an exaggerated manner by the subject, thereby inducing their subordination. First, its philosophical roots are explored in the thought of Thomas Hobbes, particularly in <i>Leviathan</i>, where the notion of omnipotent authority plays a central role. The argument that defines this fallacy is then presented and formalized, allowing for an initial characterization of it as a material fallacy—one whose flaw lies in the content of its premises rather than in its structure. However, given the limitations of traditional conceptions of fallacies, this study will be complemented by contemporary approaches, such as epistemic, dialectical, and dialogical perspectives, which help to understand the functioning and implications of the fallacy of unbeatable force in broader argumentative contexts. Finally, the analysis is expanded in light of emerging neurocognitive approaches, which suggest that the fallacy in question transcends its discursive dimension, manifesting as a cognitive mechanism of (self)subordination and long-term control. This mechanism operates as a dual shield: on the one hand, it withdraws subjects, overprotecting them; on the other, it safeguards the entity to which superior power is attributed from any critical scrutiny, thereby reinforcing its dominant position.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":46219,"journal":{"name":"Argumentation","volume":"39 3","pages":"371 - 392"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2025-06-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Argumentation","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10503-025-09666-z","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"COMMUNICATION","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This article aims to characterize the fallacy of unbeatable force as an argument whose flawed structure grants an illusion of invulnerability to a phenomenon or entity whose power is perceived in an exaggerated manner by the subject, thereby inducing their subordination. First, its philosophical roots are explored in the thought of Thomas Hobbes, particularly in Leviathan, where the notion of omnipotent authority plays a central role. The argument that defines this fallacy is then presented and formalized, allowing for an initial characterization of it as a material fallacy—one whose flaw lies in the content of its premises rather than in its structure. However, given the limitations of traditional conceptions of fallacies, this study will be complemented by contemporary approaches, such as epistemic, dialectical, and dialogical perspectives, which help to understand the functioning and implications of the fallacy of unbeatable force in broader argumentative contexts. Finally, the analysis is expanded in light of emerging neurocognitive approaches, which suggest that the fallacy in question transcends its discursive dimension, manifesting as a cognitive mechanism of (self)subordination and long-term control. This mechanism operates as a dual shield: on the one hand, it withdraws subjects, overprotecting them; on the other, it safeguards the entity to which superior power is attributed from any critical scrutiny, thereby reinforcing its dominant position.
期刊介绍:
Argumentation is an international and interdisciplinary journal. Its aim is to gather academic contributions from a wide range of scholarly backgrounds and approaches to reasoning, natural inference and persuasion: communication, rhetoric (classical and modern), linguistics, discourse analysis, pragmatics, psychology, philosophy, logic (formal and informal), critical thinking, history and law. Its scope includes a diversity of interests, varying from philosophical, theoretical and analytical to empirical and practical topics. Argumentation publishes papers, book reviews, a yearly bibliography, and announcements of conferences and seminars.To be considered for publication in the journal, a paper must satisfy all of these criteria:1. Report research that is within the journals’ scope: concentrating on argumentation 2. Pose a clear and relevant research question 3. Make a contribution to the literature that connects with the state of the art in the field of argumentation theory 4. Be sound in methodology and analysis 5. Provide appropriate evidence and argumentation for the conclusions 6. Be presented in a clear and intelligible fashion in standard English