Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium analysis in a two-population strategic matching queue with nonzero matching times

IF 0.9 4区管理学 Q4 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-09-11 DOI:10.1016/j.orl.2025.107362

Hung Q. Nguyen , Tuan Phung-Duc

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study a two-population strategic queueing game in a double-ended system with nonzero matching times, where agents choose to join or balk. The resulting multi-dimensional state complicates analysis, but it can be shown that one dimension can be omitted in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium strategies are threshold-based. Numerical results show that targeting one side with optimal pricing can improve social welfare, offering insights for system design.

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非零匹配时间下两种群策略匹配队列的子博弈完美纳什均衡分析

研究了具有非零匹配时间的双端系统中的两种群策略排队博弈，其中agent选择加入或不加入。由此产生的多维状态使分析变得复杂，但可以证明在子博弈完美纳什均衡中可以省略一个维度。均衡策略是基于阈值的。数值计算结果表明，以最优定价为目标的一方可以提高社会福利，为制度设计提供启示。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Operations Research Letters 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

9.10%

发文量

111

审稿时长

83 days

期刊介绍： Operations Research Letters is committed to the rapid review and fast publication of short articles on all aspects of operations research and analytics. Apart from a limitation to eight journal pages, quality, originality, relevance and clarity are the only criteria for selecting the papers to be published. ORL covers the broad field of optimization, stochastic models and game theory. Specific areas of interest include networks, routing, location, queueing, scheduling, inventory, reliability, and financial engineering. We wish to explore interfaces with other fields such as life sciences and health care, artificial intelligence and machine learning, energy distribution, and computational social sciences and humanities. Our traditional strength is in methodology, including theory, modelling, algorithms and computational studies. We also welcome novel applications and concise literature reviews.