Optimal Contracts for Delegated Order Execution

IF 2.4 3区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Martin Larsson, Johannes Muhle-Karbe, Benjamin Weber
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We determine the optimal affine contract for a client who delegates their order execution to a dealer. Existence and uniqueness are established for general linear price impact dynamics of the dealer's trades. Explicit solutions are available for the model of Obizhaeva and Wang, for example, and a simple gradient descent algorithm is applicable in general. The optimal contract allows the client to almost achieve the first-best performance without any agency conflicts for many reasonable parameter values. Common trading arrangements arise as limiting cases. In particular, optimal contracts for many reasonable model parameters resemble the “fixing contract” common in FX markets, in that they only incorporate market prices briefly before the conclusion of the trade. Price manipulation by the dealer is avoided by only putting a sufficiently small weight on these prices, and complementing this part of the contract with a sufficiently large fixed fee.

Abstract Image

委托订单执行的最优合同
我们为委托经销商执行订单的客户确定最优仿射合约。建立了交易商交易的一般线性价格影响动态的存在唯一性。例如Obizhaeva和Wang的模型有显式解,一般使用简单的梯度下降算法。对于许多合理的参数值,最优契约允许客户端在不产生任何代理冲突的情况下几乎达到最优性能。常见的交易安排是在有限情况下出现的。特别是,许多合理模型参数的最优合约类似于外汇市场中常见的“固定合约”,因为它们只在交易结束前短暂地纳入市场价格。通过在这些价格上施加足够小的权重,并以足够大的固定费用补充合同的这一部分,可以避免交易商操纵价格。
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来源期刊
Mathematical Finance
Mathematical Finance 数学-数学跨学科应用
CiteScore
4.10
自引率
6.20%
发文量
27
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: Mathematical Finance seeks to publish original research articles focused on the development and application of novel mathematical and statistical methods for the analysis of financial problems. The journal welcomes contributions on new statistical methods for the analysis of financial problems. Empirical results will be appropriate to the extent that they illustrate a statistical technique, validate a model or provide insight into a financial problem. Papers whose main contribution rests on empirical results derived with standard approaches will not be considered.
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