Evolutionary game of stakeholders in the ‘high-speed rail battle’ under a dual principal-agent relationship

Abstract

This paper investigates conflicts and strategic interactions in high-speed rail (HSR) station placement, where limited resources and high demand have led local governments to compete for station rights, often inciting public protests. This study employs a dual principal-agent framework to analyze stakeholder conflicts. An evolutionary game theory model, the “high-speed rail battle” model, is constructed, incorporating the public, local governments, and the central decision-makers. Simulation analysis investigate the impact of initial strategy choices and key parameter variations on stakeholder decision-making. The research findings indicate that (1) In the initiation stage, the public leverage's public opinion feedback to advocate for station placement, while local governments convey demands to higher authorities, and central decision-makers uphold the original plan. (2) In the development stage, as collective resistance gains strength, local governments align with the public to pressure central decision-makers, who, after weighing the economic savings and credibility risks, find the new plan acceptable. (3) In the outbreak stage, despite the potential resistance costs, the public takes risks for additional benefits, while local governments suppress protests to avoid penalties, and central decision-makers adopt the new plan when its benefits outweigh repression and potential credibility costs. (4) Simulations demonstrate that enhanced HSR utility fuels public resistance, triggering protest suppression by local governments under high social disorder risks or pressure, while central decision-makers dynamically adapt policies based on protest intensity and instability costs. This study aims to promote the rationality and feasibility of project decisions while maintaining social stability and harmony.