Evolutionary multigame with perception competition between conformists and imitators

Abstract

Perceptual heterogeneity reflects individuals’ different perspectives on the same thing, and competition among individuals with different perceptions of either social dilemmas or payoffs can independently promote cooperation. In this article, we construct a coupled competition mechanism to explore the impact of competition between the two types of perceptions. Specifically, individuals’ differing perceptions of social dilemmas are modeled by the snowdrift game ($SDG$) and the prisoner’s dilemma game ($PDG$), differing perceptions of payoffs are captured by conformists and imitators. Extensive simulations show that the coupled competition mechanism markedly promotes cooperation. $PDG$ players are substantially less competitive than $SDG$ players, which dominate the population. Conformists act as an amplifier, inclined to choose cooperation when cooperators are dominant, thus further promoting cooperation levels. When defectors are dominant, conformists may temporarily choose to defect in the short term, but defection is unsustainable due to lower average accumulated payoffs. We further find that intensified competition among imitators weakens the competitiveness of conformists and diminishes their positive impact on cooperation. Finally, we demonstrate the impact of different proportions of conformists, network structures, and noise levels on the main results to verify the robustness of the model.