Biosecurity in the Australian production animal industry

Abstract

Biosecurity is the focus of this issue of the Australian Veterinary Journal. It is central to Australia's position as a global food exporter and its reputation for a country with a high animal health status. This position and reputation are jealously guarded, supported by strong animal health policies, regulations, and response plans at both national and state levels. These efforts are further bolstered by research and development funding from the animal production industries. This support is evident in the research underpinning the eight papers published here. The funding and contributing authors come from state government departments, universities, national agencies, industry research and development bodies, private sector companies, and mainstream pork producers. They are working together or independently, but always with the common goal of strengthening preparedness and response to emergency animal disease (EAD) incursions in Australia or the Asia Pacific region.

The lead paper in this special issue documents and analyzes the Australian pork supply chain and its implications for national biosecurity management. Authored by Schrobback et al.¹ from CSIRO, the Sunpork Group, and Teys Australia, it combines supply chain expertise with industry experience and previously unpublished data. This paper exemplifies the diversity of authors contributing to biosecurity response planning. It provides insights into the serious downstream consequences and costs of supply chain interruptions from both an EAD and its response. This information is invaluable for EAD controllers and planners, highlighting the need for solutions that mitigate the impact of disease while allowing businesses to survive control or eradication measures.

Ye et al.,² from the Australian Centre for Disease Control and Preparedness and CSIRO, describe reagents for a competition Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) ELISA suitable for differentiating infected and vaccinated animals. This test is integral to separating vaccination responses from infection responses in countries where vaccination is part of the FMD response.

Given Australia's significant feral pig population, the survival of viruses in the carcasses of affected pigs impacts disease control responses. Two papers, one by Schlosberg et al.³ (from Ausvet Pty Ltd with coauthors from four other groups) and the other by Barnes et al.⁴ (University of Queensland), present data on the likely risk of disease spread from carcasses of animals that died from African swine fever (ASF) or FMD. Both papers inform the EAD response and resource allocation.

An analysis of foot-and-mouth disease mitigation strategies in Australia and Denmark by Wagner et al.⁵ found that modeling theoretical incursion scenarios identified three common areas for future recommendations: resource allocation and control, economic efficiency, and alternative interventions.

Richards et al.,⁶ from the Sunpork group and Animal Control Technologies Australia, demonstrate the efficacy of using micro-encapsulated sodium nitrite (MESN) added to feed for the humane destruction of pigs. MESN, an Australian innovation previously used for feral pigs, was incorporated into the emergency animal disease response following a need identified during EAD exercises in Queensland for the humane slaughter of large numbers of pigs during an African swine fever incursion. Over the last 50 years, EAD responders have had few new tools for mammalian disease control responses, making the use of MESN a significant advance.

Continuing the theme of responding to the regional FMD threat, Graham et al.⁷ from Charles Sturt University investigate the impact of Australia's strengthened border security following the 2022 FMD outbreak in Indonesia. Resources were allocated to promote biosecurity awareness and engagement among sheep producers in New South Wales, Australia. Following the Indonesian outbreak, half the participants made changes to on-farm biosecurity. The authors note that ‘understanding the factors influencing both the immediate and long-term effectiveness of extension activities would be beneficial’. There is always more to do.

The final paper in this issue, by Richards et al.,⁸ with funding from SunPork, and using methodology described by the World Animal Health Association (WOAH), qualitatively assesses the disease risk from importing fresh porcine semen into Australia. They found that the risk of introducing porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus, Senecavirus A, porcine epidemic diarrhoea virus, and African swine fever virus exceeded Australia's appropriate level of protection, even when WOAH mitigations were applied.